by Bramantyo Prijosusilo

Ever since our founding fathers decided to drop the “seven words” from the Jakarta Charter, there have been Islamist groups who have been struggling to get them back into the Constitution. These “seven words” were originally part of the Pancasila State philosophy, namely the first point; “Belief in One God”. The seven words that were dropped translate as … “and Muslims are obliged to implement Sharia.”  The reason for dropping these words in 1945 was to accommodate the feelings of the non-Muslim people of Eastern Indonesia.  After the “Reformasi” in 1998, Islamist groups tried to but could not gain enough support in Parliament to bring back the “seven words” in to the Constitution.  Amongst Islamic circles there were also discussions and debates on what really constitutes as Sharia. The problem with the State implementing Sharia is that there are as many interpretations of Sharia as there are interpretations of Islam.

After the “Reformasi” numerous Islamist groups that hitherto had been underground surfaced and began to openly, and eventually successfully, challenge the law that stipulated that every political party and mass-organization had to acknowledge the State philosophy, Pancasila, as their basic philosophy.  The most vicious attack on the Pancasila philosophy was probably the attacks carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) on the peaceful, pro-pluralism demonstration on the birthday of Pancasila last year. Although many people were seriously injured, the perpetrators of the attacks were given lenient sentences by judges, and had ministers and celebrities visiting them in their jail cells, where television crews followed them as if they were pop-stars.  Although the political efforts to have Sharia enshrined as the law of the land have subsided, the dream to make Indonesia a Sharia state has not been, and probably will never be, vanquished.

Some transnational political groups who want to make Indonesia a Sharia state, such as the Hizbut Tahrir (HT) are active and vocal in Indonesia, and our openness makes their development traceable. However the more shadowy transnational organizations like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or the Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM) do not trust the open and democratic atmosphere we have nurtured since 1998, and as they work underground their ups and downs are more difficult to follow.  The few indicators that we can observe to gauge their developments, such as relatively frequent the arrests made by the police of suspected JI terrorists, or the rare press appearances of IM’s leader here, the blind cleric Al Habsyi, can only give a blurred picture of the Islamic underground.  Al Habsyi, who is a staunch supporter of the FPI and was imprisoned for life by Suharto for his involvement in the bombing of the Borobudur in 1985 and pardoned  by Habibie in 1999, is recorded to mingle in high society.  Together with the support we have seen given by several cabinet ministers to HT’s activities and to FPI’s leadership, these things indicate that the Islamist ideology has sympathizers amongst the Indonesian elite.  The question is, to what extent does Islamism currently penetrate and influence the Indonesian elite?

Considering  how the FPI morphed from the Pam-Swakarsa militia formed by the then General Wiranto during the downfall of his master, Suharto, the question to ask is do the Indonesian elite really support Islamist ideas or do they court the Islamist only for practical political purposes?  The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) grew out of IM’s cells amongst university students but now that it hungers for power it is keen to shed the image of Islamism. Researchers have also discovered an interesting phenomenon in which the ruling classes in Java, which traditionally are associated with Javanese interpretations of Islam, have become keen to observe a more puritan expression of Islam. This is obvious in the long sentences of Arabic now habitually said in the openings of formal speeches and the building of prayer rooms in homes, replacing the traditional “empty room” traditionally reserved for the rice goddess Dewi Sri.  On the other hand the younger generation of Islamic scholars, children of respected leaders and heads of religious institutions, are keen to study English and the humanities in the West and have been the driving force behind the development of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Indonesia.  Meanwhile, though several regions have adopted elements of Sharia in their bye-laws, there is serious discussion about the legality of districts adopting laws that might contradict our Constitution.  Indonesians also tend to vote for secular parties in general elections.

These phenomena indicate that although there is a growth of Islamism in Indonesia, and although most Indonesian Muslims are keen to observe their religion in their daily lives, the majority currently do not agree with the idea of having a Sharia based state.  This condition, summed up by the late Nurcholis Madjid in his slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Parties, No”, baffles Islamists like Irfan Suryahadi Awwas, a senior member of the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin (MMI) who asks why Indonesian Muslims don’t want Sharia implemented by the State when they marry under the Sharia and want to be buried according to Sharia when they die.

This uniquely Indonesian condition is an asset that the newly elected government should employ to the full in its effort to implement the Constitution’s mission statement of playing an active role in building peace, within our borders and also in the wider Islamic world. The government should not be afraid of the hardcore and vocal Islamist groups who attack minorities and pose as if they are widely supported because they are not.   The implementation of universal values of justice and compassion in dealing with conflicts in areas such as Papua, where State violence continues to strengthen the separatist movement there, would strengthen the moral stature of our nation at home and abroad.  While our country is rife with poverty, corruption, injustice, and State violence, the form of peaceful Islam that has been developing over centuries here will remain impotent, unable to influence the world in any way, and the specter of Islamist Puritanism will continue to haunt us.[]

This article is exclusively published by Center for Minority, Gender, and Human Rights.